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*
Lecturer, College of Law, Australian National University (ANU). LL.M., Harvard Law School,
1999; and LL.B. (Honours), University of London, 1998. Areas of academic interest include comparative
constitutional theory and comparative Islamic and Western jurisprudence.
**
Lecturer of U.K. Constitutional Law, European Union law, and Common Law Institution and
Reasoning at The Institute of Legal Studies (TILS), Lahore, Pakistan. LL.M. in International Organizations, International Criminal Law and Crime Prevention, UNICRI, 2007; M.A. in Political Science, Punjab University, 2003; and LL.B. (Honours), University of London, 2001.
1 For a description of the cartoons, please see Martin Asser, What the Muhammad Cartoons Portray,
BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4693292.stm (last visited Feb. 9, 2006); see also
Gwladys Fouche, Danish Paper Rejected Jesus Cartoons, THE GUARDIAN, http://www.guardian.com/
world/2006/feb/03/religion.uk (last visited Feb. 6, 2006). (Earlier, in 2003, the same newspaper refused
to publish cartoons of Jesus Christ on the grounds that they would ‘provoke an outcry’).
2 See Arab Ministers Condemn Cartoons, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_
east/4668068.stm (last visited Jan. 31, 2006); see also Appeals for Calm Over Cartoon Row, CNN, http://
edition.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/asiapcf/02/07/cartoon.protests/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2006).
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On September 30th, 2005, Denmark’s leading newspaper, Jyllands-Posten,
published twelve (12) caricatures of the prophet Muhammed of Islam
(“P.B.U.H.”) depicting him in a manner blatantly offensive to followers of the
Islamic faith.1 These cartoons also appeared to conflate the categories of religion, race, and terrorism in a manner that implied causal connections between the
former and the latter. The publication of the cartoons sparked a seemingly neverending cycle of protests around the world, culminating in violent demonstrations
in several Muslim-majority states.2 In Europe, however, the publication of the
cartoons was staunchly defended on the grounds of freedom of expression, with
several other newspapers publishing them in a show of support for the principles
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3 The staunch defense of the Danish cartoons in Europe focuses primarily on the protection of the
fundamental right to free speech guaranteed in all European countries. According to this point of view,
the freedoms of expression and the press are near-absolute values at the core of European democracies.
This argument has two facets: firstly, that European countries hold the freedom of expression very dearly
as a primary political value and, secondly, that the European states have no legal basis to prohibit blasphemy against Islam - there is also a clear implication that Islamic (shari’a) law and Muslim countries
devalue such fundamental freedoms and hence the protests do not deserve serious consideration. For
example, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, leader of the Liberal (Venstre) Party, and the Prime Minister of
Denmark refused to meet ambassadors from a number of Muslim countries and entertain their protests.
The Prime Minister suggested that those who were aggrieved should take the matter to the courts. ‘As
prime minister, I have no power whatsoever to limit the press - nor do I want such a power. It is a basic
principle of our democracy that a prime minister cannot control the press,’ he added. See Paul Belien,
Europe Criticises Copenhagen over Cartoons, THE BRUSSELS JOURNAL, http://www.brusselsjournal.com/
node/589 (last visited Mar. 11, 2014).
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of free speech and democracy.3 The refusal of European governments to proscribe the publication of the cartoons led to recriminations that this was tantamount to state protection of ‘blasphemous’ materials and was evidence of covert
and overt ‘Islamophobia.’ The reduction of the defense of the Danish cartoons in
the name of freedom of expression to such a strategic façade is clearly problematic because it ignores the troubled history and the complex and dynamic debates
that have raged in Europe and the United States over the role of the state in
regulating public discourse. The unleashed clash of reductionisms does, however, intuitively grasp deep philosophical tensions between the characterizations
of religion and race, between free speech and hate speech, and between the freedoms of expression and of religion.
In this paper we will attempt to deconstruct the free speech defense of the
Danish caricatures in order to highlight the tensions enumerated above, focusing
particularly on the regulation of expression under the European Convention on
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“ECHR”). A scrutiny of the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) reveals the difficulties inherent in defining permissible limits on expression, particularly as it
involves the identification and prioritization of interests that are worthy of protection under a state’s law. The struggles over the characterization of certain
interests as fundamental rights, in turn, raise questions over the ‘fundamentalness’ of rights and the valuation of foundational social and political values that
the rhetoric of rights presumes as incontrovertible. This study seeks to advance
the argument that fundamental rights, such as the freedom of expression, are
legal constructs whose value is contingent on the ends they are employed to serve
in a given socio-political environment. While the contingency of fundamental
rights is palpable in debates over their definition and over what they include or
exclude, it is most clearly visible in the clash of fundamental rights, in particular
the freedoms of expression and religion.
In order to deconstruct the nature of fundamental rights through a case study
of the regulation of freedom of expression under the ECHR, we first present a
brief overview of the philosophical debates over the nature of rights. In Part I,
we also outline the constitutional jurisprudence on freedom of expression in the
United States as the prototype of free speech ‘absolutism,’ which is the kind
proclaimed by some of the defenders of the cartoons. In Part II, we compare the
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Decoding the Freedom of Expression

American jurisprudence on freedom of expression, which avows its primacy over
other competing rights to equality and freedom of religion, with the ‘European’
approach. We demonstrate that the domestic laws of many European states and
the ECHR allows extensive limitations on the freedom of expression falling
under the broad rubric of hate speech. We discuss two specific categories of
limitations on expression, which are recognized by the constitutional laws of European states as well as the ECHR, namely: Holocaust denial and blasphemy.
We argue that the refusal of European governments to accede to demands to curb
the publication of the Danish cartoons was not defensible on the grounds that the
applicable human rights law forbade such a limitation on the freedom of expression. We contend in Part III that the defense of the Danish cartoons is rooted in a
liberal understanding of fundamental rights that is based upon distinctions between race and religion, between hate speech and blasphemy, and between the
freedom of expression and the freedom of religion that are riveted with contradictions. The Danish case thus highlights the veracity of longstanding critiques of
the liberal conception of rights. Lastly, we conclude that the defense of the Danish cartoons on the grounds of freedom of expression is inherently political and
seeks to provide the cover of fundamental-ness and naturalness to a position that
is inherently contingent.
II. Is there such a thing as an Absolute Fundamental Right?: Freedom
of Expression and the Regulation of Hate Speech in the U.S.A.
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4 See Jeremy Waldron, Nonsense Upon Stilts? - A Reply, in NONSENSE UPON STILTS: BENTHAM,
BURKE AND MARX ON THE RIGHTS OF MAN 166-68 (Jeremy Waldon ed., Methuen & Co., 1987).
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The position taken by many in Europe in the defense of the Danish cartoons
appears to rely on the notion of the freedom of expression being a near absolute
right. This position also appears to be rooted in a primarily liberal conception of
rights wherein fundamental freedoms are designed to primarily protect spheres of
private autonomy from governmental interference. In the liberal idea of rights,
the evil that fundamental rights shield the citizens against is the evil of a repressive state. Thus, while fundamental rights protect the earmarked areas of private
space from state intrusion, they are not structured to protect the individual citizen, or minority groups and communities, from the tyranny of fellow citizens.
This state-centric conception of rights is by no means uncontroversial. Heated
philosophical debates on the nature and content of rights and fundamental freedoms have taken place on at least three different planes.
On one level, the traditional liberal conception has been criticized for implicitly imbuing culturally and morally relative positions with an aura of naturalness
and universality.4 This is problematic for liberalism as it is an ideology that
essentially seeks to provide all humans with the opportunity to pursue their vision
of a good life, so long as that pursuit does not interfere with others’ visions. In
response, the advocates of liberal rights have advanced two strategies. First, a
distinction is made between the “’right’ and the ‘good’ - between a framework of
basic rights and liberties, and the conception of good that people may choose to
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5 Michael J. Sandel, The Political Theory of the Procedural Republic, in THE RULE OF LAW: IDEAL
IDEOLOGY? 88 (Hutchinson & Monahan eds., Carswell, 1987).
6 Id.
7 See Waldron, supra note 4, at 163-66.
8 See Ronald Dworkin, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (Harvard Univ. Press, 1977).
9 See Jeremy Waldron, A Rights-Based Critique of a Bill of Rights, 13 OJLS 18 (1993).
10 See David P. Forsyth, HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD POLITICS 167-172 (Univ. of Nebraska Press, 2d
ed. 1989) for a brief overview of the philosophical foundations of the liberal conception of rights.
11 Id. at 169-71.
OR
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pursue within that framework.”5 A fair framework of rights thus comes before
the liberal pursuit of individual ends. In regards to freedom of expression, for
example, “it is one thing to defend the right to free speech so that people may be
free to form their own opinions and choose their own ends, but something else to
support it on the grounds that a life of political discussion is inherently worthier.”6 In adopting the former justification traditional liberals can claim a certain degree of value neutrality and universality for their position. Secondly,
liberals increasingly seek to rely on public morality, or the shared foundations of
rights-claims beneath superficial disagreements over the justification for and content of specific rights.7 Often, it is possible to argue that these shared foundations of public morality are found in constitutional documents, judicial decisions,
and/or majoritarian agreement.8 This becomes problematic where there is a
threat of a clash between majoritarian democracy and constitutionally entrenched
judicial review mechanisms. In such a scenario, the debate on the nature and
justification for rights appears to crystallize around the narrower and more specific issues of constitutional structure and institutional competence, which may
dictate whether courts or legislatures are better suited to safeguard the interests
and values characterized as fundamental rights.9
The second plane on which the liberal conception of rights is critiqued is on
account of its negativity. It is alleged that while this conception imposes negative obligations or constraints, it does not entail positive obligations upon the
state to create the socio-political conditions necessary for the fulfillment of the
interests and values that are classified as fundamental rights.10 Thus, for example, while the state may be barred from suppressing free speech, it cannot be
called upon to stop private individuals or non-state groups from creating an environment which has an indirect chilling effect on others’ expression. This negative conception of fundamental rights is motivated by a fear that if the state is
granted such a power to interfere with private action, it will abuse that authority
to serve its own ends and expand its coercive power. Further, even if the state
uses that power benevolently to safeguard one group’s freedom, it may be seen as
discriminating at the expense of others, thereby sowing the seeds of social discord. The problem for the liberal position, however, is that the social terrain
everywhere is marked by enormous disparities in wealth, socio-political power
and opportunities for advancement.11 The state is often the only player capable
of challenging the centers of socio-economic power and with the constraints imposed upon it there is little guarantee that these private social and economic networks will not exercise the coercive powers that are being denied to the state.
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12 Mary Ann Glendon, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT
Press, 1991).

OF

POLITICAL DISCOURSE 14 (The Free

13 Will Kymlicka, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY OF MINORITY RIGHTS 92 (Clarendon Press, 1995).
14

Id. at 75-115.

15

Larry Alexander, Banning Hate Speech and the Sticks and Stones Defense, 13 CONST. COMM. 71
(1996).
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16 Representative examples of work that discuss hate speech in the context of racist speech include
critical race theorists such as Mari J. Matsuda. See Mari J. Matsuda, WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL
RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (Mari J. Matsuda et al. eds., 1993).
See also Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, MUST WE DEFEND NAZIS? HATE SPEECH, PORNOGRAPHY
AND THE NEW FIRST AMENDMENT (New York Univ. Press, 1997); Richard L. Abel, SPEAKING RESPECT,
RESPECTING SPEECH (Univ. of Chicago Press, 1998). For a leading example of discussion on hate speech
in terms of sexist speech, see Catherine MacKinnon, ONLY WORDS (Harv. Univ. Press, 1996).
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The third plane on which the liberal conception of rights is critiqued is on
account of its allegedly rampant individualism. Communitarian and civic republican critics of the liberal notion of rights argue that it is liberalism itself which,
by promoting the idea of humans as atomistic beings, cultivates a fragmented
social environment in which discussion of collective aims and ideals becomes
secondary: “[r]ights talk, in its absoluteness, promotes unrealistic expectations,
heightens social conflict, and inhibits dialogue that might lead towards consensus, accommodation, or at least the discovery of common ground.”12 The problem again for both the liberal and communitarian perspectives, however, is that
of the inequalities in the distribution of socio-political power and economic resources. If the state remains withdrawn from the role of an equalizer there is no
guarantee that particular social groups, especially those that enjoy a disproportionate share of influence and power, will voluntarily cede that advantage even if
communitarian politics flourishes in localized discourses. This will particularly
be the case where sub-national groups are constituted along distinct racial, ethnic,
religious and/or cultural lines.13 In an influential advance in liberal thinking,
Will Kymlicka argued that liberalism can accommodate the interests of minority
groups while also taking on board communitarian insights, but that would require
the recognition of an entirely new set of group rights that impose both negative
and positive obligations on the state to facilitate the preservation of distinct ‘societal cultures’ of minority groups.14
These controversies are not entirely theoretical. Nowhere are the philosophical tensions inherent in a strong form of liberal rights conception and its dissonance with minority interests more evident than on the issue of hate speech
regulation in the leading constitutional democracy in the world: the United States
of America. The regulation of hate speech, which may be defined as “epithets
conventionally understood to be insulting references to characteristics such as
race, gender, nationality, ethnicity, religion, and sexual preference”15 has been a
hotly debated issue in the United States and much has been written on this topic.
Arguments in support of hate speech regulation and curtailment of the First
Amendment rights usually arise in the context of racist and sexist speech;16
through constitutional arguments advocating the primacy of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection before the law over the First Amend-
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Decoding the Freedom of Expression

ment’s free speech protection.17 Such advocacy, however, faces a challenging
constitutional obstacle, as the text of the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution is seemingly absolute on its plain reading:18
Amendment I - Freedom of Religion, Press, Expression: Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press
. . .19

The weight of judicial opinion in the United States appears to favor a conception of the freedom of expression guaranteed by the First Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution as a near-absolute right, which trumps other competing values.20
This view is rooted in the belief that words cannot harm and free expression can
only be beneficial since it fortifies democratic values.21 As one commentator
notes, “[c]onstruing freedom of expression as an absolute right, the view held by
many U.S. citizens when issues of freedom of expression arise, is perhaps meant
to be captured by the adage: ‘Sticks and stones may break my bones, but words
will never hurt me.’”22 Nonetheless, it has been contended that a number of
doctrines recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court allow exceptions to the freedom
of expression. Notable amongst these are allowances for restrictions based on
the threat or likelihood of violence such as for ‘clear and present danger’ or
‘imminent lawless action,’23 and ‘fighting words;’24 as well as legitimate “time,
17 See R. George Wright, Traces Of Violence: Gadamer, Habermas, And The Hate Speech Problem,
76 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 991, 994-95 (2000).
18 See Edward J. Eberle, Cross Burning, Hate Speech, and Free Speech in America, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
953, 959-70 (2004).

U.S. CONST. amend. I.

20

See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256, 258 (1974).

21

To cite Justice Holmes’ famous oft-quoted dissent:
When men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe even
more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired
is better reached by free trade in ideas – that the best of truth is the power of the thought to get
itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which
their wishes safely can be carried out.

Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919). Academic opinion on this count is also well-entrenched. For representative examples, see Charles Fried, The New First Amendment Jurisprudence: A
Threat to Liberty, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 225, 251-53 (1992); Calvin R. Massey, Hate Speech, Cultural
Diversity, and the Foundational Paradigms of Free Expression, 40 UCLA L. REV. 103, 116-17 (1992);
Steven G. Gey, The Case Against Postmodern Censorship Theory, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 193, 195-96
(1996); Nadine Strossen, Hate Speech and Pornography: Do We Have to Choose Between Freedom of
Speech and Equality? 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 449, 454-55 (1996); Alexander, supra note 15, at 73;
Gary Goodpaster, Equality and Free Speech: The Case Against Substantive Equality, 82 IOWA L. REV.
645, 668-70 (1997).
22 J. Angelo Corlett & Robert Francescotti, Foundations of a Theory of Hate Speech, 48 WAYNE L.
REV. 1071, 1074 (2002).

24

84

Fisch, supra note 23, at 476-79.
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23 For an analysis of the evolution of the incitement to violence categories of permissible restrictions,
see William B. Fisch, Hate Speech in the Constitutional Law of the United States, 50 AM. J. COMP. L.
463, 471-76 (2002); see also David G. Barnum, The Clear and Present Danger Test in Anglo-American
and European Law, 7 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 263, 263-81 (2006).
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Decoding the Freedom of Expression

place, and manner restrictions.”25 Expression may also be legitimately suppressed when it is found to be obscene or pornographic,26 or on grounds of national security.27 Therefore, one commentator concludes: “[i]t is unarguable that
there should be absolute freedom to think what one wants; it does not follow,
however – either legally, logically, or philosophically – that one may openly
express whatever one thinks, whenever and wherever one desires.”28
However, while there is no denying that some restrictions on speech are allowed as contended above, a judicious review of the jurisprudence of the U.S.
Supreme Court reveals that such limitations on the freedom of expression are
very narrowly construed.29 For example, although at one time the U.S. Supreme
Court allowed limits on speech which presented a “clear and present danger” to
society, i.e. speech that may incite unlawful violence,30 in Brandenburg v. Ohio
the court narrowly interpreted this standard, restricting its applicability to speech
that was likely to cause or incite imminent violence.31 Similarly, in Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire, the Supreme Court laid down the doctrine of “fighting words,”
making it illegal to “address any offensive, derisive, or annoying word to any
person who is lawfully in any street or any public place . . . [or] make any noise
or exclamation in his presence and hearing with intent to deride, offend or annoy
25 However, “[i]f government regulates the time, place or manner of speech, it must regulate in a way
that does not take sides between competing ideas.” See Charles Fried, The New First Amendment Jurisprudence: A Threat to Liberty, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 225, 226, 231 (1992).

27 See Matthew Silverman, National Security and the First Amendment: A Judicial Role in Maximizing Public Access to Information, 78 IND. L.J. 1101 (2003); Laura Barandes, A Helping Hand: Addressing New Implications Of The Espionage Act On Freedom Of The Press, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 371 (2007);
and see also Emily Posner, The War On Speech In The War On Terror: An Examination Of The Espionage Act Applied To Modern First Amendment Doctrine, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 717 (2007).
28 See Kenneth Lasson, Holocaust Denial and the First Amendment: The Quest for Truth in a Free
Society, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 35, 68-69 (1997).
29 See Alexander Tsesis, The Empirical Shortcomings Of First Amendment Jurisprudence: A Historical Perspective On The Power Of Hate Speech, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 729, 732-39 (2000).

31 See generally Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969); see also Fisch, supra note 23, at
474-75.
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30 See Charles Lewis Nier III, Racial Hatred: A Comparative Analysis of the Hate Crime Laws of the
United States and Germany, 13 DICK. J. INT’L L. 241, 266 (1995); Friedrich Kübler, How Much Freedom
for Racist Speech?: Transnational Aspects of a Conflict of Human Rights, 27 HOFSTRA L. REV. 335, 348
(1998).
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26 See Annalisa Siracusa, Sixth Annual Review Of Gender And Sexuality Law: I. Constitutional Law
Chapter: Obscenity, 6 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 347, 349-51 (2005); Nasoan Sheftel-Gomes, Your Revolution: The Federal Communications Commission, Obscenity And The Chilling Of Artistic Expression On
Radio Airwaves, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 191, 199-207 (2006); Cara L. Newman, Eyes Wide
Open, Minds Wide Shut: Art, Obscenity, And The First Amendment In Contemporary America, 53
DEPAUL L. REV. 121, 132-140 (2003). For a critique of restriction of speech on the charge of obscenity
and pornography, see generally Amy Adler, What’s Left?: Hate Speech, Pornography, and the Problem
for Artistic Expression, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1499 (1996); and Arnold H. Loewy, Obscenity: An Outdated
Concept for the Twenty-First Century, 10 NEXUS J. OP. 21 (2005). For a critique that the restrictions of
speech to counter the harms of pornography do not go far enough, see Morrison Torrey, Thoughts About
Why the First Amendment Operates to Stifle the Freedom and Equality of a Subordinated Majority, 21
WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 25 (1999). For a comparison of the U.S. and Canadian approaches towards the
regulation of obscene speech, see Justin A. Giordano, The United States Constitution’s First Amendment
vs. The Canadian Charter Of Rights And Freedoms: A Comparative Analysis Of Obscenity And Pornography As Forms Of Expression, 26 N.C. CENT. L.J. 71, 72-73 (2004).
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Decoding the Freedom of Expression

him.”32 However, the court stated that it would hold speech to constitute fighting
words only if there were a reasonable risk of violence.33 This doctrine was further restricted in practice when in Cohen v. California, the Court required that the
fighting words must be directed at a specific individual.34 Most recently, in
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, the court declared hate speech legislation to be unconstitutional that proscribed the placing on public or private property of “a symbol,
object, appellation characterization or graffiti, including, but not limited to, a
burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows or has reasonable grounds to
know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color,
creed, religion or gender.”35 The Court ruled that the ordinance violated the principle of content neutrality as it targeted specific viewpoints only.
The First Amendment jurisprudence of the U.S. courts thus appears to be
based on the liberal conception of fundamental freedoms as negative liberties
outlined at the outset. It focuses on state action, and consistently upholds a distinction between public and private domains. As such, the state is barred from
interfering in the private domain and may not restrict any expression (or at least
the content thereof) by individuals.36 This is a manifestation of the distrust of
government that is at the heart of American constitutional politics.37 It is further
argued that while legislation may be effective in preventing harmful action, hate
speech legislation is generally ineffective and any benefits that may be availed
from banning hate speech are countered by the risk of the state’s abuse of speech
regulation to suppress critical expression. This is in essence a ‘slippery slope’
argument.38 A similar argument cautions against hate speech laws because of
their chilling effect on expression in general. Advocates of this position express
concerns that hate speech legislation hinders the establishment of an efficient
market for ideas and insist that absolute freedom of speech is in fact beneficial
for minority viewpoints.39 Before we critique this liberal reconstruction of the
freedom of expression in U.S. constitutional jurisprudence, it may be helpful to
see if this view is shared across the Atlantic.
See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 569 (1942).

33

See Fisch, supra note 23, at 478-79; see also Dorsett, supra note 21, at 266-67.

34

See generally Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); see also Dorsett, supra note 21, at 267-68.

35

R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 380 (1992).

36

See W. Bradley Wendel, “Certain Fundamental Truths”: A Dialectic On Negative And Positive
Liberty In Hate-Speech Cases, 65:2 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 67-68 (2002).
37

Id.

38

See Frederick Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 HARV. L. REV. 361, 363 (1985); see also Kathleen E.
Mahoney, Hate Speech: Affirmation Or Contradiction Of Freedom Of Expression, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV.
789, 802 (1996).
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39 See Donald E. Lively, Reformist Myopia and the Imperative of Progress: Lessons for the PostBrown Era, 46 VAND. L. REV. 865, 898 (1993). For rebuttal, see Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Ten
Arguments Against Hate-Speech Regulation: How Valid?, 23 N. Ky. L. Rev. 475, 479-80 (1996); Jean
Stefancic & Richard Delgado, A Shifting Balance: Freedom of Expression and Hate-Speech Restriction,
78 IOWA L. REV. 737, 742 (1993); see also Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431, 438 (1990). It is also countered that hate speech
regulation detracts from the real task of countering racism itself. See generally Dorsett, supra note 21.
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Decoding the Freedom of Expression

III. The ‘European’ Conception of Fundamental Rights: Freedom of
Expression under the European Convention on Human Rights
A. Regulation of Hate Speech and Holocaust Denial Laws in Europe
The position adopted by the defenders of the Danish cartoons appears to be
very much in line with the status of freedom of expression as a near absolute
right in American constitutional law. This has not historically been the European
standpoint on the freedom of expression, to the extent an over-arching European
agreement or understanding on the freedom of expression exists. European states
- despite increasing economic, political, cultural and legal integration - have separate legal systems and have written constitutions that provide for the protection
of fundamental rights, with the notable exception of the United Kingdom.40
However, most European states, including those where the cartoons were published, are parties to the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (hereinafter the ‘European Convention’ or
simply the ‘Convention’).41 The Convention was the brainchild of the Council of
Europe, a transnational political organization created in the aftermath of the Second World War in 1949 with the aim of creating a common platform for the
promotion of democracy, the rule of law and fundamental human rights all over
Europe.42 It came into force in 1953 and presently has forty-six member states,
eight hundred million citizens of which have the right of individual petition to the
European Court of Human Rights, the adjudicatory body created under the Convention.43 The Court’s judgments are binding on the member states. The Convention may thus be described as representing the “minimum human rights
standards” agreed upon by the European states, or the “Basic Law of Europe;”
and the Convention system may be considered “the most successful human rights

41 Council of Europe, Convention For Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Apr.
11, 1950, CETS No. 005, available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf. For a
list of member states of the Council of Europe that have signed and ratified the agreement, see Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=005&CM=&DF=&CL=ENG (last visited Apr. 8,
2014). Specifically, Denmark ratified the Convention on 13th April, 1953; Norway ratified on 15th
January, 1952; France ratified on 3rd May, 1974; Germany ratified on 5th December, 1952; Italy ratified
on 26th October 1955; and Spain ratified on 4th October, 1979.
42 See The Statute of the Council of Europe, art. 1, May 5, 1949, 87 U.N.T.S. 103, available at http://
conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/treaties/html/001.htm. For an overview of the debates contextualizing the
drafting of the Convention and its approach towards hate speech regulation, see Stephanie Farrior, Molding The Matrix: The Historical and Theoretical Foundations of International Law Concerning Hate
Speech, 14 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 3, 63 -78 (1996).
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43 See generally Lord Woolfe, REVIEW OF THE WORKING METHODS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF
HUMAN RIGHTS, (Eur. Ct. H. R., 2005). The right of individual petition is provided under Article 34 of
the Convention to “any person, non-governmental organisation or group of individuals claiming to be the
victim of a violation.” Council of Europe, Convention For Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms art. 34, Apr. 11, 1950, CETS No. 005, available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf.
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40 In 1998, the United Kingdom finally passed the Human Rights Act, thereby incorporating the
European Convention directly into domestic law. This is the U.K.’s statutory Bill of Rights. Human
Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (U.K.).
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Decoding the Freedom of Expression

system in the world.”44 The enforcement of the Convention has been further
strengthened by its incorporation into European Union law.45
Article 10 of the Convention guarantees the freedom of expression to the citizens of all the European states that are a party to the Convention and its Protocols.46 A plain reading of the above provision indicates that, in sharp contrast to
the First Amendment of the U.S. constitution, freedom of expression is subject to
limitations on a number of grounds:
Article 10
Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include
freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas
without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. . .
The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or
penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public
safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health
or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for
preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for
maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.47

Given the expansive array of grounds on which free speech may be curtailed,
it is not surprising that expression is subject to a number of legal limitations in
most European countries that would not be countenanced in American constitutional law.48 It is also notable that the text of Article 10 of the Convention does
not see an inherent tension between such limitations on free speech and
democracy.
In contrast to the United States, most European states have laws that forbid
hate speech. In fact, the United States appears to be the only Western state that
See Philip Leach, TAKING

A

CASE

TO THE

EUROPEAN COURT

OF

HUMAN RIGHTS 4 (Blackstone,
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45 See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 6, 2010 O.J.C 83/01, available at
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:083:0013:0046:en:PDF; see also European Convention on Human Rights: Accession of the European Union, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, http://
hub.coe.int/what-we-do/human-rights/eu-accession-to-the-convention (last visited May 5, 2014).
46 Convention For Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Apr. 11, 1950, Council
of Europe, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/005.htm.
(Since the Convention’s entry into force, thirteen (13) Protocols have been adopted some of which Protocols 1, 4, 6, 7, 12 and 13 - have added additional rights and freedoms to the original text. Protocol
11 restructured the enforcement machinery).
47 Id. art. 10.
48 This difference in the European and American approaches towards the freedom of expression has
been attributed to a number of factors, including a greater confidence in America on the outcomes of the
battle of ideas, such as during the civil rights era and the Vietnam War protests, as opposed to Europe
whose history does not support such optimism. On the flip side, the American public generally does not
trust the government and its officials enough to entrust them with such powers of censorship as opposed
to Europe where there is greater confidence in the government’s ability to provide social direction. See
Winfried Brugger, Ban On or Protection of Hate Speech? Some Observations Based on German and
American Law, 17 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L.F. 1, 14 (2002).
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Decoding the Freedom of Expression

allows such extended protection to hate speech.49 For example, recent legislation
in Germany,50 enacted in response to a rise in neo-Nazi activities, criminalizes
attacks on human dignity through incitement to hatred and dissemination of writings aimed at instigating hatred.51 The law also creates lesser offenses of insult,
ridicule, and defamation.52 This legislation adds to the offence of insult against
personal honor, which has been on the statute books since 1871.53 In the U.K., a
state closest to the U.S. in terms of a shared political ideology, incitement to
racial hatred is a specific offence under various sections of the Public Order Act,
1986.54 The Act substituted similar provisions in the Public Order Act of 1936,
and the Race Relations Act of 1965, and is in addition to the surviving common
law relating to the breach of peace.55 To give another example, while the freedoms of expression, press, and assembly are constitutionally guaranteed in Sweden, the Instrument of Government also places explicit restrictions on these
freedoms.56 The Riksdag (parliament) may restrict free speech but such restric-
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49 For a comparison between the minimal intervention permissible under US Constitutional jurisprudence and the differing approach in several other Western democratic states, including Canada, UK and
Germany, see Michel Rosenfeld, Hate Speech In Constitutional Jurisprudence: A Comparative Analysis,
24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1523, 1542-54 (2003). For an overview of the historical reasons for the differing
approaches, see Kevin Boyle, Hate Speech – The United States Versus the Rest of the World?, 53 ME. L.
REV. 487, 491-93 (2001). It is interesting to note that Canada allows much more stringent regulation of
hate speech than is constitutionally permissible in the U.S.A., even though the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms, 1 S.C. V (1982), accords free speech protection in language similar to the First
Amendment. Canada has a number of criminal provisions that proscribe advocacy of genocide, incitement of hatred threatening a breach of the peace, and public and willful expression of ideas intended to
promote hatred against an identifiable group. See Canadian Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c.C-46, § 319.
For an overview of the international and Canadian positions on hate speech, see Kathleen E. Mahoney,
supra note 39, at 804-06 (1996). See also Roy Leeper, Keegstra And R.A.V.: A Comparative Analysis Of
The Canadian And U.S. Approaches To Hate Speech Legislation, 5 COMM. L. & POL’Y 295, 308-20
(2000), wherein the author underscores the difference between the communitarian and libertarian traditions underpinning Canadian and American judicial approaches, respectively.
50 The German Constitution expressly recognizes limitations, albeit of a different kind, on the freedom of expression. Art. 5(1) declares that “everybody has the right freely to express and disseminate
their opinions orally, in writing or visually” and that “There shall be no censorship.” However, this
freedom is limited by two important provisions: “limitations embodied in the provisions of general legislation, statutory provisions for the protection of young persons and the citizens’ right to personal respect.” See the GRUDGENSETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DUETSCHLAND [GRUNDGESETZ] [GG] [BASIC
LAW], May 23, 1949, at Art. 5(1) - (3) (Ger.). For an overview of the German constitutional jurisprudence on hate speech and relevant legislation, see Laura R. Palmer, A Very Clear and Present Danger:
Hate Speech, Media Reform, and Post-Conflict Democratization in Kosovo, 26 YALE J. INT’L L. 179,
200-06 (2001); Brugger, supra note 48, at 5-15; and see also Bradley A. Appleman, Hate Speech: A
Comparison Of The Approaches Taken By The United States And Germany, 14 WIS. INT’L L.J. 422, 42934 (1996).
51 See STRAFGESETZBUCH [StGB] [P ENAL CODE], Nov. 13, 1998, FEDERAL LAW GAZETTE 130,
(Ger.).
52 Id.
53 Id. § 185. (The offence carries a punishment of imprisonment of up to one year and fine).
54 Public Order Act, (1986) §§ 18, 19, 23 (U.K.).
55 See for example, Arrowsmith v. United Kingdom, App. No. 7050/75, 3 Eur. H.R. Rep. 218, 21920, 243 (1978), where a pacifist was arrested and prosecuted for incitement to disaffection after she
distributed leaflets to members of the armed forces advocating the abandonment of military service. The
European Commission declared her complaint inadmissible holding that the prosecution was a reasonable
limitation on her freedom of expression.
56 See REGERINGSFORMEN [RF] [CONSTITUTION] 2:1 (Swed.).
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Decoding the Freedom of Expression

tions “may be imposed only to satisfy a purpose acceptable in a democratic society. The restriction may never exceed what is necessary having regard to the
purpose which occasioned it, nor may it be carried so far as to constitute a threat
to the free formation of opinion as one of the foundations of democracy.”57 Further, the Swedish Penal Code specifically prohibits racist speech.58 The most
pertinent example, however, is Denmark. The Danish Criminal Code provides a
penalty of imprisonment for up to two (2) years, and a fine, for the dissemination
of a statement by which a group of people are “threaten[ed], insult[ed], or
degrad[ed] on account of their race, colour, national or ethnic origin, religion, or
sexual inclination.”59 The fact that the offence is in the nature of propaganda
activities shall be considered “an aggravating circumstance” at the sentencing
stage.60
Many European states also have laws which criminalize the denial of the Holocaust.61 Many commentators in the United States argued to make the denial of
the Holocaust a per se category of hate speech, i.e. denial of Holocaust should be
prohibited whether or not such denial presents a clear and present danger of “imminent lawless action” or constitutes “fighting words.”62 Such arguments have
found little favor in American jurisprudence, which is dominated by the primacy
of the First Amendment as discussed in the previous section. In contrast to the
United States, the denial of the Holocaust is a serious criminal offence in a number of European countries.63 A British historian, David Irving, was recently convicted and sentenced to a term of three years of imprisonment for the denial of
57

See REGERINGSFORMEN [RF] [CONSTITUTION] 2:20(1) and 2:22 (Swed.).
BROTTSBALKEN [BRB] [PENAL CODE] 16:8 (Swed.).
59 See Straffeloven (Strfl) § 266 b (1).
60 Id. § 266 b (2). For elaboration of these provisions, see the opinions of The Committee on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination in the case of Kamal Quereshi v. Denmark, Communication No.
33/2003, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/66/D/33/2003 (2005) available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/country/
decisions/33-2003.html; and the case of Mohammed Hassan Gelle v. Denmark, Communication No. 34/
2004, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/68/D/34/2004 (2004), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/6715d3
bdbeff3c0dc125714d004f62e0?Opendocument;
and the case of Ahmad Najaati Sadic v. Denmark, Communication No. 25/2002, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/62/
D/25/2002 (2003), available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/country/decisions/25-2002.html.
61 See Peter R. Teachout, Making Holocaust Denial a Crime: Reflections on European Anti-Negationist Laws from the Perspective of U.S. Constitutional Experience, 30 VT. L. REV. 655, 657 (2005). For
a review of Germany’s Holocaust denial laws, see Eric Stein, History Against Free Speech: The New
German Law Against the ‘Auschwitz’ - and Other – ‘Lies’, 85 MICH. L. REV. 277, 285-87 (1986); Lasson, supra note 28. In the U.K. the Labour Party proposed the creation of an offence punishable with
imprisonment for Holocaust denial before its 1997 election victory. However, the Labour governments of
the last decade have not followed through on this proposal. Canadian law also treats Holocaust denial as
hate speech per se. For example, in the landmark case of R. v. Zundel, [1992] R.C.S. 731, 732 (Can.), the
defendant, was charged with violating the Canadian criminal code by publishing false statements ‘likely
to cause injury or mischief to a public interest’ under Canadian Criminal Code R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, s.
177 (Can.).
62 Some academics have argued that Holocaust denial should be automatically recognized as a form
of hate speech since it results in immediate psychological and emotional harm to the Jews. It is contended
that the intended victims of Holocaust denial often fear the onslaught of violence and many suffer from
post-traumatic stress disorders as a result. Therefore, some have advocated that the denial of Holocaust
should be recognized as a distinct tort since the victims of such actions have been ‘grievously hurt’ by
such speech. See Lasson, supra note 28, at 70.
63 See Teachout, supra note 61, at 657.
58
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Decoding the Freedom of Expression

the existence of gas chambers at Auschwitz.64 The European Court of Human
Rights has repeatedly held that the existence of Holocaust denial laws is consistent with the freedom of expression protected under Article 10, and falls within
the limitations provided within that Article as well as Article 17 of the
Convention.65
The criminalization of Holocaust denial has been justified on a number of
grounds. Memories of the Second World War and Holocaust in Europe are still
alive in European consciousness. European states understandably have a particular sensitivity towards any actions which are reminiscent of those dark days.66 In
this view, the criminalization of Holocaust denial is a unique measure designed
to curb a unique evil.67 However, this argument ought to apply to all genocides
whose enormity is recognized in European history.68 Another more universal
argument for barring Holocaust denial specifically and racist speech generally is
that such speech deliberately seeks to undermine the pluralistic nature of society
by making a particular minority feel unwelcome, thereby discouraging them from
participating in the political process.69 Holocaust denial and racist speech has
been described as “pure-form discrimination” since it serves no conceivable political function other than offending a specific religious or racial minority.70 Holocaust denial has also been described as group defamation.71
Some academics argue that even if racist speech does not present a ‘clear and
present danger’ of immediate violence against a minority, allowing such speech
will invariably lead to structural violence in the long run. The purpose of Holocaust denial is to de-humanize the Jews and inculcate attitudes in society which
makes violence against them more acceptable. Therefore, it is argued that there
is a causal connection between anti-Semitism and Holocaust denial:

65 See Garaudy v. France, 373 Eur. Ct. H.R. 7 (2003), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/
eng-press/pages/search.aspx?i=003-788339-805233#{%22itemid%22:[%22003-788339-805233%22]};
Marais v. France, App. No. 31159/96 (1996), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/
search.aspx#{%22fulltext%22:[%22marais%20v%20france%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001-88275%22]};
and Honsik v. Austria, App. No. 31159/96, 184 (1995), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/
pages/search.aspx#{%22dmdocnumber%22:[%22666524%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001-2362%22]}.
66

See Lasson, supra note 28, at 74-76.

67

See id. at 78.

68

69

See id. at 70.

70

See id. at 54-55.

71

See, for example, Yonover, supra note 64; see also Lasson, supra note 28, at 70-71.
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For example, Bernard Lewis, a reputed historian, was prosecuted before a French court after questioning the genocidal status of the massacre of 1.5 million Armenians by the Ottoman Empire. The
criminal prosecution under France’s Holocaust denial law failed as that statute was held to apply only to
the denial of the Nazi genocide of the Jews. A subsequent civil case, however, was successful resulting in
a fine of $ 2000. See id. at 66.
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64 See Holocaust Denier Irving is Jailed, BBC (Feb. 20, 2006, 20:19 GMT), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hi/europe/4733820.stm. In 1994, the German constitutional court upheld the ban on a meeting at which
David Irving was scheduled to speak, ruling that the so-called “Auschwitz lie” was not covered by the
freedom of speech. Similarly in 1995, a state court in Berlin convicted a neo-Nazi leader for Holocaust
denial. The German approach towards Holocaust denial may be contrasted from the legal position in the
U.S.A. See Geri J. Yonover, Anti-Semitism and Holocaust Denial in the Academy: A Tort Remedy,101
DICK. L. REV. 71, 74-76 (1996).
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Rhetoric can often trigger action. Speech can turn into conduct. Words can
migrate into ‘sticks and stones’ which do, indeed, harm us. It is no accident that
German narrative depicting Jews as evil preceded and justified the Nazi
genocide.72
It is pertinent to note that all of the above arguments apply equally to racist as
well as blasphemous speech involving the disparagement of a minority religion.73
If the first argument does not apply to hate speech against a defined group, such
as the Muslim, North African, and Arab minorities, it is because there has not yet
been a definite history of discrimination and violence against these minorities in
Europe. It is a weak argument to hold that ‘group defamation’ against Muslims
will be barred only after discrimination against them has reached a historical
threshold of genocide, or at least persecution, when a sufficient number have
demonstrably suffered. The alternative is for European Muslims to protest and
resort to such violence as to thereby create a ‘history’ of their own.
B. Freedom of Expression and Blasphemy Laws in Europe
A broad survey of the laws of European states reveals that while there are a
number of states which have no blasphemy laws on the statute books, including
France, Spain, and Portugal, other European states attach criminal sanctions to
blasphemous libel. Austria,74 Germany, Netherlands, Switzerland, and Italy have
blasphemy and/or disparagement of religion laws on the statute books.75 The
prohibition on blasphemy has been explicitly recognized as a limitation on free
speech in the Irish Constitution, and the Republic of Ireland has enforced its
blasphemy law in the recent past.76 However, in many of the states that have
blasphemy laws, these laws have not been enforced in recent history. For exam-

Whoever, in circumstances where his behaviour is likely to arouse justified indignation, disparages or insults a person who or an object which is being venerated by a church or religious
community established within the country, or a dogma, a legally authorised custom or a legally
authorised institution of such a church or religious community, shall be liable to a prison sentence of up to six months or a fine of up to 360 daily rates.

See Laws Penalizing Blasphemy, Apostasy and Defamation of Religion are Widespread, PEW RE(Nov. 21, 2012), http://www.pewforum.org/2012/11/21/laws-penalizing-blasphemy-apostasyand-defamation-of-religion-are-widespread/.
76 See IR. CONST., 1937, art. 40.6.I.i. For a history of the blasphemy laws in Ireland see generally
Paul O’Higgins, Blasphemy in Irish Law, 23 MOD. L. REV. 151 (1960).
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72 Yonover, supra note 64, at 78, referring to Michael Blain, Group Defamation and the Holocaust,
in GROUP DEFAMATION AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 54 (Monroe H. Freedman & Eric M. Freedman eds.,
1995).
73 See International Law—Genocide—U.N. Tribunal Finds That Mass Media Hate Speech Constitutes Genocide, Incitement to Genocide, and Crimes Against Humanity, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2769 (2004)
for a discussion of Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza, and Ngeze (the Media Case), Case No. ICTR99-52-T (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda Trial Chamber I Dec. 3, 2003). Mary J. Matsuda concludes that
racist hate speech is “so historically untenable, so dangerous, and so tied to perpetuation of violence and
degradation of the very classes of human beings who are least equipped to respond” and is “a mechanism
of subordination, reinforcing a historical vertical relationship.” See Mary J. Matsuda, Public Response to
Racist Speech: Considering the Victim’s Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320, 2357 (1989).
74 STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] [PENAL CODE] § 188 lays down the offence of disparaging religious
precepts. This provision was at issue Otto-Preminger Institut v. Austria, 19 Eur. Ct. H.R. 34, 41 (1994).
For the text of § 188, see paragraph 25. The section reads:
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ple, while the U.K. has non-statutory common law blasphemous libel provisions,
it has been pointed out that after the Human Rights Act 1998:
“it is a reasonable speculation that as a consequence of that legislation
any prosecution for blasphemy today . . . would be likely to fail or, if a
conviction were secured, would probably be overturned on appeal . . . on
grounds either of discrimination, of denial of the right to freedom of expression, or of the absence of certainty. Such an outcome would, in effect,
constitute the demise of the law of blasphemy.”77
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77 SELECT COMMITTEE ON RELIGIOUS OFFENCES IN ENGLAND AND WALES, FIRST REPORT, 2003, H.L.
79 ¶ 20, available at http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/ld200203/ldselect/ldrelof/95/
9505.htm#a2.
78 Whitehouse v. Lemon (1979) 1 A.C. 617 (H.L. 1978) (consolidated appeals).
79 Id. at 618.
80 Gay News Ltd. v. United Kingdom, 5 Eur. Ct. H.R. 123 (1982).
81 Wingrove v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. 43 (1996), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-58080.
82 Id.; Compare Yonover, supra note 64, at 80-81, where the example of a Model Group Defamation
Statute that won first prize in a student contest at Hofstra University was considered. According to the
author, “. . .the Model Statute’s requirement is chilling. The statute requires a state agency to review
films or movies before they can be shown and, if found to be defamatory, the movie shall, by court order
sought by the reviewing agency, not be shown.”
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Notably, the Human Rights Act was designed to give effect to the ECHR in
U.K.’s domestic law.
The application of the blasphemy laws in a number of European countries,
especially in U.K., have been challenged on the grounds that these violate the
freedom of expression and the freedom of religion protected under the European
Convention. However, contrary to the opinion expressed in the Select Committee
Report noted above, the European Commission of Human Rights, defunct since
1998, and the European Court of Human Rights, adjudicatory institutions created
under the Convention, have consistently ruled that the enforcement of blasphemy
laws in European states is a legitimate restriction of the freedom of expression.
In Whitehouse v. Lemon, for example, the defendant was prosecuted for the common law offence of blasphemy in U.K. after he published an illustrated poem
describing certain homosexual acts involving Jesus Christ.78 He was convicted
of publishing a blasphemous libel and both the Court of Appeal and the House of
Lords upheld the conviction.79 The defendant filed an application before the European Commission of Human Rights on the grounds that his freedom of expression and freedom of religion had been violated by the prosecution. The
Commission rejected the application as “manifestly ill-founded” and held that the
prosecution was a proportionate measure for the protection of the religious sensibilities of others.80
Wingrove v. United Kingdom, another case from the U.K., arose from the censorship of the film “Visions of Ecstasy,” which depicted the supposed erotic fantasies of St. Teresa.81 The British Board of Film Classification rejected the
application for a classification certificate on the grounds of blasphemy. The producers claimed that this violated their freedom of expression.82 The case was
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declared admissible by the Commission, but was rejected by the Court. The aim
of the interference, the protection of Christians against serious offence to their
beliefs, was held to be fully consonant with the aims of Articles 9 and 10 of the
Convention. The Court noted that blasphemy legislations are still in force in
various European countries, although these are rarely applied, and ruled that the
national authorities were best placed (subject to final supervision by the Court) to
decide what restrictions were necessary and appropriate. The Court stated that:
Strong arguments have been advanced in favour of the abolition of blasphemy laws, for example, that such laws may discriminate against different faiths or denominations - as put forward by the applicant - or that
legal mechanisms are inadequate to deal with matters of faith or individual belief . . . However, the fact remains that there is as yet not sufficient
common ground in the legal and social orders of the member States of the
Council of Europe to conclude that a system whereby a State can impose
restrictions on the propagation of material on the basis that it is blasphemous is, in itself, unnecessary in a democratic society and thus incompatible with the Convention.”83

83 Wingrove v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. 43 (1996), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-58080.
84 Council of Europe, Convention For Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Apr.
11, 1950, CETS No. 005, available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/005.htm:

Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and
in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and
observance.
Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for
the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms
of others.
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85 Convention For Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 9(2), Apr. 11, 1950,
Council of Europe, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/
005.htm.
86 R. v. Chief Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Choudhury, 1 All E.R. 306, 313 (Q.B.
1991).
87 Choudhury v. United Kingdom, App. No. 17439/90, Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 12 (1990),
available at http://echr.ketse.com/doc/17439.90-en-19910305/view/.
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Article 9 of the European Convention guarantees the freedom of religion to the
citizens of Europe.84 This fundamental freedom is also subject to limitation on
various grounds, including “the protection of the rights and freedoms of others,”
although fewer limitations on the freedom of religion are enumerated as opposed
to those on the freedom of expression.85 In R v. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate
ex parte Choudhury, the petitioner claimed that the U.K. violated his freedom of
religion by allowing him to be subjected to blasphemy.86 The case arose when
the U.K. Court of Appeal turned down a judicial review petition filed by a Muslim citizen against the refusal of the magistrate to issue a summons for blasphemy and seditious libel against Salman Rushdie, for insults to Islam in his
book “The Satanic Verses.”87 The Court of Appeal held the Magistrate’s decision to be correct since the Common Law offence of blasphemy is limited to
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Id.
Id.
90 Id.
91 In Whitehouse v. Lemon, Lord Scarman in the House of Lords adopted the definition of blasphemy given in Stephen’s Digest of the Criminal Law, 9th edition (1950) Article 214:
89

Every publication is said to be blasphemous which contains any contemptuous, reviling, scurrilous or ludicrous matter relating to God, Jesus Christ or the Bible, or the formularies of the
Church of England as by law established. It is not blasphemous to speak or publish opinions
hostile to the Christian religion, or to deny the existence of God, if the publication is couched in
decent and temperate language. The test to be applied is as to the manner in which the doctrines
are advocated and not to the substance of the doctrines themselves.
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Whitehouse v. Lemon, (1979) 1 A.C. 617, 665 (H.L. 1978) (consolidated appeals).
92 See, for example, Nicholas Smith, The Crime of Blasphemy and the Protection of Fundamental
Human Rights, 116 S. AFRICAN L. J. 162, 169-70 (1999). It has been argued that “if the believer asks to
be spared the pain of vigorous disagreement of others, it amounts to asking for special treatment.”
93 Otto-Preminger Institut v. Austria, 19 Eur. Ct. H.R. 34, 37 (1994).
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attacks on Christianity.88 The complainant’s subsequent application to the European Commission of Human Rights was declared inadmissible.89 The Commission ruled that there was no violation of Article 9 in the lack of any criminal
sanctions against those who publish material offending the religious sensibilities
of non-Christians.90
The above jurisprudence of the European Commission of Human Rights and
the European Court of Human Rights, binding upon all member states in Europe,
compels the conclusion that any member state of the European Convention may
enact and enforce blasphemy laws. The enactment of blasphemy laws is considered a legitimate and sometimes a desirable limitation on the freedom of expression. However, the freedom of religion guaranteed in Article 9 of Convention
does not impose a positive obligation upon the member states to enact blasphemy
laws if they do not have such laws already in place. This is so even if, as in the
Salman Rushdie case, the blasphemy laws do not provide equal treatment to all
religions. The above approach of the European Court is in consonance with
traditional rights theory, which holds that it is not a fundamental right of those
who believe in a religion, even if they form a majority of the population, to be
protected from blasphemy. This would be the case since those who do not believe in the religion blasphemed also have a belief which they have a right to
express. This may indeed be true if blasphemy were defined as the expression of
an opinion contrary to an established religion, as was the case as recently as the
early part of the last century in most countries in Europe. However, the modern
legal definition of blasphemy, where such a definition is relevant, focuses on the
manner and form, rather than the content of the offending speech, as well the
likelihood of such speech to create a hostile environment for those espousing a
certain belief.91
Another traditional argument against recognizing a right to protection from
blasphemy is that it would be tantamount to giving undue preference to the freedom of religion over the freedom of expression.92 In the case of Otto-PremingerInstitut v. Austria, the European Court discussed the legality of the seizure and
forfeiture of a movie (“Das Liebeskonzil”) for attempted violation of §188 of the
Austrian penal code, the offence of disparaging religious precept.93 The Court

35138-lfi_11-2 Sheet No. 14 Side B

06/12/2014 13:38:49

\\jciprod01\productn\L\LFI\11-2\LFI201.txt

unknown

Seq: 18

12-JUN-14

13:16

Decoding the Freedom of Expression

analysed the situation as one which presented a conflict between the freedom of
religion and the freedom of artistic expression.94 The Court, having stressed that
in democratic societies the followers of a particular religion, even if the majority
religion, must be prepared to face opposing opinions, proceeded to state:
However, the manner in which religious beliefs and doctrines are opposed
or denied is a matter which may engage the responsibility of the State,
notably its responsibility to ensure the peaceful enjoyment of the right
guaranteed under Article 9 (art. 9) to the holders of those beliefs and
doctrines. Indeed, in extreme cases the effect of particular methods of
opposing or denying religious beliefs can be such as to inhibit those who
hold such beliefs from exercising their freedom to hold and express
them.95

96
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94 The freedom of religion is provided in Article 14 of the Austrian Constitution (Basic Law),
whereas artistic freedom is protected under Article 17a. The leading precedent of the Austrian Supreme
Court pertained to the censorship of another film. The Supreme Court suggested ‘that if a work of art
impinges on the freedom of religious and worship guaranteed by Article 14 of the Basic Law, that may
constitute an abuse of the freedom of artistic expression and therefore be contrary to the law’ (judgment
of 19 December 1985, Medien und Recht (Media and Law) 1986, no. 2, p. 15). See id. at 41.
95 Id. at 55.
96 Otto-Preminger Institut v. Austria, 19 Eur. Ct. H.R. 34, 43-44, 57 (1994).

35138-lfi_11-2 Sheet No. 14 Side B

The Court found the film to be an artistic expression that was “gratuitously
offensive to others and thus an infringement of their rights.”96 Hence, the censorship was justified.
It is evident that in the Court’s view the evil in blasphemy is not the expression of a contrary opinion but rather the manner and form of such expression
which interferes with a religious group’s ability to practice their religion. The
concerns with such speech ought to be heightened when the target religion is the
religion of a minority rather than the majority. Legal allowance of blasphemy
would then be tantamount to the majority, as distinct from the state, denying the
minority their freedom of religion. The liberal view of the freedom of religion
and fundamental freedoms generally as negative liberties and the stress upon
preventing the state from limiting opportunities of following a particular religion
miss the mark in this context: the majority would be allowed to achieve extralegally what it cannot achieve through an indirect control of state power.
The message that was clearly disseminated by the cartoons was that all Muslims are terrorists. If Muslims in Europe have to look over their shoulders at all
times for the fear of being branded as terrorists, then such speech would have a
chilling effect on the worship, practice, and observance of their religion. This
would be a violation of Article 9 as per the European Court’s own analysis,
which suggests that all states ought to have a positive obligation to protect their
citizens’ freedom of religion. Unfortunately, the Court has not yet taken the argument to its logical conclusion by holding that citizens have a right to protection
from such gratuitous blasphemy. Blasphemy against a minority’s religion is an
even more sinister wrong and states should be obliged to prevent such abuse of
the freedom of expression.
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IV. A Clash of Categories?: Race, Religion, and Liberal Fundamental
Rights
Another difficulty inherent in permitting blasphemy against a minority’s religion is that such acts often conflate the categories of race and religion to such an
act that it is impossible to make meaningful distinctions between hate speech and
blasphemy, and between the race or ethnicity and the religion of the minority
communities whose religious beliefs are the target of abuse. The Danish
cartoons provide a quintessential example of such a phenomenon. The main image published by Jyllands-Posten depicts a man failing to identify the prophet of
Islam in a criminal identity line-up as all the suspects, presumably belonging to
different religions and creeds, are dressed up similarly.97 Ironically, all of the
other caricatures published on that page effectively advise on how to identify the
Muslim-terrorist in such a line-up in reality. He is a bearded Arab, dressed in a
distinctive garb, supports a turban and compels his women to be covered from
head to toe. The religion, race and culture of the Muslim-Arab-terrorist are the
leitmotif of the caricatures. What the cartoons do not inform the viewer is how to
distinguish the Muslim terrorist from the Muslim pacifist, or an immigrant citizen
of Europe with whom he shares his religion-race-culture. Is this blasphemy or is
this hate speech?98 If the newspaper wished to publish cartoons depicting ‘Arab
terrorists’ in exactly the same manner it would not have to change a thing except
the title of the piece. The publication of such cartoons would have been legitimately suppressed as hate speech.
The fine distinction between hate speech and blasphemy against a minority
community’s religion, especially when that minority community also has distinct
racial or ethnic and cultural commonalities, enables the creation of an environment of abuse, ridicule, and social persecution that cannot be achieved directly.
The ridicule of religion, only one of the inseparable facets of identity, does not
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98 In January 2006, the regional public prosecutor for Viborg (Statsadvokaten i Viborg) decided not
to initiate criminal proceedings against the newspaper under Article 140 of the Danish Criminal Code.
Article 140 provides that any person who publicly mocks or scorns the religious doctrines or acts of
worship of any lawfully existing religious community may be punished with imprisonment for a term of
up to four months. On appeal the Director of Public Prosecutions (Rigsadvokaten) upheld the decision in
March 2006. The DPP’s decision makes for interesting reading. First, in a disingenuous understanding of
Islam the DPP held that ridiculing prophet Muhammad (P.B.U.H.) was not tantamount to a mockery of
the “religious doctrines or acts of worship” in Islam. Article 140, it was held, did not “ encompass
religious feelings which are not tied to a community’s religious doctrines or acts of worship.” Secondly,
the DPP stretched logic to breaking point over the analysis of specific cartoons. Specifically, as regards
the caricature depicting prophet Muhammad (P.B.U.H.) with a bomb as his turban, the DPP admitted it
could also “be taken to depict the Prophet Muhammad as a violent person and as a rather intimidating or
frightening figure. . . . This depiction might with good reason be understood as an affront and insult to the
Prophet, who represents an ideal for believing Muslims. However, such a depiction is not an expression
of mockery or ridicule, and almost certainly not of scorn within the meaning of Article 140 of the Danish
Criminal Code. The concept of scorn covers contempt and debasement, which in their usual meaning
would not cover situations depicting a figure such as that shown in drawing. . .“ See Ben el Mahi v.
Denmark, App. No. 5853/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2006), available at http://echr.ketse.com/doc/5853.06-en20061211/.
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97 For an archived image, see Jyllands-Posten, Muhammad Cartoons Controversy, WIKIPEDIA http://
upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/7/75/Jyllands-Posten-pg3-article-in-Sept-30-2005-edition-of-KulturWeekend-entitled-Muhammeds-ansigt.png.
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Nothing in [the] Convention may be interpreted as implying for any State,
group or person any right to engage in any activity or perform any act
aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein

100 Human Rights Council Res., Rep. of the Human Rights Council, 7th Sess., 20 Feb. 2008, A/HRC/
7/19 at ¶ 54 (20 Feb. 2008).
101

98

Id. at ¶ 57.
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99 See U.N. Secretary-General, Reports, Studies, and Other Documentation for the Preparatory Committee and the World Conference, ¶ U.N. Doc. A/CONF.189/PC.1/7 (Apr. 13, 2000).
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render such an attack on the social position of a minority community any less
grave than an act of bigotry which focuses on the racial identity markers of that
community. In fact, it is arguable that such an act of blasphemy is a particularly
sinister form of hate speech or “aggravated discrimination,”99 and the “conflation
of racial, cultural and religious factors” may be “highlighted as one of the central
causes of the resurgence of racism and its increasing complexity.”100 In the context of increasing Islamophobia, the aggravated meeting points of racial and religious discrimination are often manifested in the “stereotypical association of
Islam with violence and terrorism - an association which is bolstered by intellectual constructs, used in political rhetoric and exaggerated by the media and which
has a profound impact on the popular imagination.”101
The emergent liberalism of the European conception of fundamental rights
displayed an inability to deal with the complexities of discrimination against minority communities constituted through overlapping identities of race, religion
and culture. The primary defect in the liberal conception of the rights to free
speech and religion is its exclusive focus on the state’s interference in the minority communities’ fundamental rights. The inherent negativity of the liberal conception not only disables the state from discriminating against minority
individuals on the basis of religion but also from preventing offensive speech by
private individuals that stifles the free exercise of religion by the minority community. However this approach, constructed through the defense of the Danish
cartoons, sits uncomfortably with the historically more communitarian ethos the
European conception of rights as less fundamental and rigid than recently professed. This communitarian ethos is reflected in the more robust action against
hate speech and Holocaust denial that is permissible to states under the ECHR.
Such an approach provides a sounder basis for mediating the conflicting values
and political aims underlying the freedoms of expression and religion by enabling the state to proscribe ridicule of a minority’s religion that amounts to aggravated discrimination and hate speech.
The freedom of expression is not the overarching value in European social
construction and the state has certain other responsibilities including the mandate
of ensuring the free exercise of religion by minority communities. This may
include the suppression of certain expression that creates an environment of hostility towards distinct racial-ethnic-religious communities by non-state actors.
Furthermore, Article 17 of the ECHR stipulates that:
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or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in the
Convention.102
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102 Convention For Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 17, Apr. 11, 1950,
Council of Europe, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/
005.htm.
103 See Norwood v. United Kingdom, App. No. 23131/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2004), available at http://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-67632#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-67632%22]}.
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 See Féret v. Belgium, 573 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/engpress/pages/search.aspx?i=003-2800730-3069797#{%22itemid%22:[%22003-2800730-3069797%22]}.
107 See Press Unit, Fact Sheet – Hate Speech, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2013), available at http://www.echr.coe.
int/Documents/FS_Hate_speech_ENG.pdf.
108 See Féret v. Belgium, 573 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/engpress/pages/search.aspx?i=003-2800730-3069797#{%22itemid%22:[%22003-2800730-3069797%22]}.
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The ECtHR frequently reads Article 17 in conjunction with other provisions as
the basis for the restriction of rights provided in the ECHR. While the ECtHR
has held in the past that there that there is neither a positive obligation on the
state to protect citizens from blasphemy against their religion nor a right to the
equal protection of blasphemy laws, there is indeed an obligation on the state to
protect its citizens from hate speech. In Norwood v. United Kingdom, the ECtHR
declined the protection of Article 10 to a member of the anti-immigration British
National Party who had been charged with an aggravated offence under section 5
of the Public Order Act 1986 for “displaying, with hostility towards a racial or
religious group, any writing, sign or other visible representation which is threatening, abusive or insulting, within the sight of a person likely to be caused harassment, alarm or distress by it.”103 The applicant displayed a poster with a
picture of the Twin Towers in flame and the statement “Islam out of Britain –
Protect the British People.”104 The ECtHR held that “the words and images on
the poster amounted to a public expression of attack on all Muslims in the United
Kingdom. Such a general, vehement attack against a religious group, linking the
group as a whole with a grave act of terrorism, is incompatible with the values
proclaimed and guaranteed by the Convention, notably tolerance, social peace
and non-discrimination.”105
In a more recent case, Féret v. Belgium, the ECtHR denied, by a narrow majority of 4:3, the protection of Article 10 to a member of the Belgian parliament
who had been disqualified from holding public office pursuant to a conviction for
incitement to racial discrimination.106 The applicant produced leaflets carrying
anti-immigration and Islamophobic slogans such as “[s]tand up against the Islamification of Belgium” and “Stop the sham integration policy.”107 Although
the majority on the Court did not find a violation of Article 17, the judges found
sufficient basis for restricting incitement to discrimination and hatred on the basis
of race and ethnic origin in the provisions of Article 10 itself.108 The only meaningful distinction between the cases mentioned above and that of the Danish
cartoons was that in the classification of offending speech. All of these cases
conflated religion with race as is evident from the offending statements. How-
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V. Conclusion
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See Glendon, supra note 12, at 12-17.
Sandel, supra note 5, at 89.
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The free speech defense of the publication advanced by the Danish authorities
falters on a number of grounds. The laws of many European states, including
those of Denmark, allow substantial limitations on the freedom of expression as
regards the prohibition on incitement, hate speech and insult. In addition, it is
within the prerogative of European states to limit the freedom of expression in
order to ban Holocaust denial, blasphemy and even the disparagement of a minority religion. Therefore, the Danish government could have prosecuted Jyllands-Posten for publishing the cartoons under its existing laws, or if the existing
laws were held to be inadequate to cover the specific facts of this case, then in
the least the Danish government could have enacted laws that would prohibit
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ever, in Norwood v. United Kingdom and Féret v. Belgium the state parties classified the offensive statements and actions as hate speech while the Danish
cartoons were classified as blasphemy and disparagement of religion. To the
extent that gratuitous blasphemy and ridicule of a minority’s religion effectively
translates into aggravated hate speech, the state should not be allowed to hide
behind such artificial distinctions and a newfound liberalism as Denmark chose
to do in defense of the caricatures.
Another problem with the liberal conception of fundamental rights highlighted
by the free speech defense of the Danish cartoons is the impoverishment of political discourse that may result from over-zealous rights talk.109 Fundamental
rights are all too frequently used in liberal discourse as trumps not only against
offending state action but also as trumps against opposing viewpoints, essentially
as debate-stoppers. The moment rights are brought up any discussion of conflicting values becomes frivolous, for a right is a right. In the liberal understanding
rights are apriori and any discussion on political and social values must take
place within the framework of rights. The primary justification of rights is that
not that they promote certain socio-political goods but rather that they help constitute fair processes within which individuals can choose their own values and
aims. As such, in liberal political and legal discourse rights act as trumps to preempt any consideration of values that fall foul of rights as conceived by the
defenders of liberal rights. This is regardless of the fact that the advocates of
liberal rights “notoriously disagree about what rights are fundamental, and about
what political arrangements the ideal of the neutral framework requires.”110 This
is essentially problematic in pluralistic societies where distinct racial-religiouscultural minorities are facing demands for integration or assimilation that they
are wont to resist. It is self-defeating to adopt a ‘take it or leave it’ approach, or
‘take it or leave’ as regards immigrants, when it comes to discussion of overarching political structures and values. An open, inclusive and civil political discourse, with a view to reach a shared understanding on social ordering is the need
of the moment, rather than a restrictive reliance on fundamental rights.
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such publications in the future. The case is stronger against the subsequent publication of the caricatures in Denmark and other European nations. Having been
put on notice that the publication of this material causes serious insult and injury
to Muslims, and consequently creates a risk of violence, the re-publication of the
cartoons was clearly the dissemination of hate speech and those newspapers who
indulged in such willful propagation of this speech were clearly guilty of the
offences of causing instigation and insult to the religious sentiments of European
Muslims. Even if it is accepted that neither the initial nor the subsequent publication fell foul of existing hate speech laws, the failure of the legal case would in
no way detract from the strength of the moral argument against the publication of
these cartoons. The failure on the part of state parties to prohibit the publication
is a gross violation of the letter as well as the spirit of the European Convention
of Human Rights.
It is of note that major newspapers in the United States generally refused to
follow in the footsteps of European news media, even though the United States
accords protections to the freedom of speech similar to those claimed by the
defenders of the caricatures in Europe. As has been demonstrated in this paper,
contrary to the strenuous assertions of some European leaders and news personalities, such a freedom of expression, absolute in its application and primary
amongst other fundamental rights and freedoms, is not a European value. The
European conception of the freedom of expression falls far short of absolutism
and allows for restrictions in the interest of maintaining social harmony and discouraging racism, sexism and insult to the religious sentiment of the citizens.
There is no denying that there is a distinct segment in the European polity that
believes that the freedom of expression should be accorded a primary status
amongst all fundamental values, but this viewpoint is far from being the consensus position in Europe. The European path towards the goal of creating open,
democratic, and multicultural societies has been, in the aftermath of the tragic
failures of the World War II era, the path of ensuring that bigotry and hateful
speech is censored. Unfortunately, now that the targets of the bigotry are the
immigrant Muslim minorities in Europe, the standards appear to be changing.
The success of the free speech defense of the Danish cartoons thus represents
an unwelcome development in the European human rights discourse. As Europe
becomes ever more diverse and pluralistic the resulting challenges can only be
met by solutions devised through open, inclusive, civil, and meaningful engagements. A robust political discourse that is mindful of histories of colonialism and
socio-economic deprivation that is at the heart of immigration, as well cultural
and religious disagreements underlying social and economic conflicts, is the need
of the moment. A political strategy grounded in fundamentalist liberalism that
presents choices in ‘take it or leave it’ terms to minority viewpoints in the new
Europe will not only fracture and polarize the debate but also exacerbate these
conflicts. If Europe has learned anything from its histories of violence against
minority communities, the path of open and inclusionary discourse will be
adopted in the hope that humans have the capacity to develop shared foundations
of co-existence through such engagement.

